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Toward a New Organology:
Instruments of Music and Science
by John Tresch* and Emily I. Dolan†
ABSTRACT
The Renaissance genre of organological treatises inventoried the forms and func-
tions of musical instruments. This article proposes an update and expansion of the 
organological tradition, examining the discourses and practices surrounding both 
musical and scientiﬁ c instruments. Drawing on examples from many periods and 
genres, we aim to capture instruments’ diverse ways of life. To that end we pro-
pose and describe a comparative “ethics of instruments”: an analysis of instruments’ 
material conﬁ gurations, social and institutional locations, degrees of freedom, and 
teleologies. This perspective makes it possible to trace the intersecting and at times 
divergent histories of science and music: their shared material practices, aesthetic 
commitments, and attitudes toward technology, as well as their impact on under-
standings of human agency and the order of nature.
LOOKING BACKWARD FROM THE DIGITAL CONVERGENCE
This Osiris collection is part of a widespread and growing scholarly fascination for 
the connections between the sciences and the arts. While much of this work has fo-
cused on the visual arts, our editors have happily shifted their attention to sounds 
and music. The previous articles in the volume demonstrate through their diversity 
the rich paths of inquiry that are opened up by this focus, leading us from Young’s 
correlations of light and sound and Helmholtz’s experiments with Klangfarbe to the 
twentieth- century military- industrial university and to questions surrounding tuning, 
temperament, and the standardization of pitch. Our contribution picks up a theme 
that has loomed large over this collection in many guises; namely, that of instru-
ments and instrumentality. In what follows, we attempt to think systematically about 
the very idea of the instrument and the central roles instruments play in science and 
music. The variable uses and interpretations of instruments are now ﬁ rmly estab-
lished as central topics in the history of science, and musicology appears to be head-
ing in a similar direction, slowly overcoming the artiﬁ cial divide that was created in 
the early twentieth century between the study of music (musicology) and the study of 
instruments (organology).1 Our goal is to suggest ways of lacing together these par-
* Department of History and Sociology of Science, University of Pennsylvania, 249 S. 36th St., 
Philadelphia, PA 19104; jtresch@sas.upenn .edu.
† Department of Music, University of Pennsylvania, Music Building, 201 S. 34th St., Philadelphia, 
PA 19104; dolanei@sas.upenn .edu.
1 According to organologist Wesley M. Oler, the term “organology” dates from Nicholas Bes-
saraboff’s seminal work, Ancient European Musical Instruments (Cambridge, Mass., 1941): in a clear 
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allel developments, by focusing on the variable uses and modes of action of instru-
ments in both ﬁ elds.
One factor that has encouraged the growing interest in the technical infrastructures 
of music and science and the connections between them is the recognition that for 
the past two decades, just about anyone working in a ﬁ eld that requires communica-
tion—including scientists, visual artists, and musicians—must make use of a new 
set of tools: those provided by the computer. Media scholars, pundits, and precocious 
preteens have helped us recognize the fecundity of computers as both instruments 
and imaginative resources. While digital technology makes both artistic and scien-
tiﬁ c productions possible, it also provides metaphors and methods (networks and 
codes, bits of information crunched and transformed) that move across the alleged 
great divide between the two cultures. Further, the computer merges two aspects of 
technical instrumentation that are often seen as diametrically opposed. On one hand 
the computer appears as an autonomous, purely rational calculating machine, pro-
cessing bits of abstracted information with inhuman rigor, speed, and accuracy. On 
the other, as digital media insert themselves into more and more aspects of our work, 
leisure, and social lives, computers seem to unite themselves ﬂ uidly and corporeally 
with human users, becoming emphatically “extensions of ourselves,” as Marshall 
McLuhan characterized all media. Even at the level of hardware design, the “form 
factor” of digital technology makes these devices appear as supple, sticky interfaces, 
forming an ergonomic skin connecting us to the world.
The sudden ubiquity of this diversiﬁ ed but integrated interface explains some of 
the urgency with which both the history of science and music studies are turning to 
studies of instruments: What is new, many ask, and what was ever thus, in humans’ 
engagement with instruments? The current proliferation of digital technologies has 
also altered our perspective on those objects that the digital replaces or imitates. All 
of the new forms of musical production and consumption—iTunes, iPods, YouTube, 
and digital editing software—reconﬁ gure the relationship between machines, in-
struments, and their traditional functions. Take for example Apple’s popular Logic 
Pro program, which allows its users the ability to control every aspect of producing 
music, “from the ﬁ rst note to the ﬁ nal master.”2 Musicians can record, edit, and mix 
music, with access to thousands of sampled instruments, pedal boards, ﬁ lters, ampli-
ﬁ ers, loops, and spaces (i.e., acoustic proﬁ les of particular locations, from cathedrals 
to wine cellars). Its encyclopedic functionality blurs the distinction between physical 
instruments and already synthesized material.
But Logic Pro doesn’t only imitate the sounds of speciﬁ c instruments. Apple prom-
ises that the user can “play models of the Hammond B3 organ, the Hohner Clavi-
net D6, and the Fender Rhodes, Wurlitzer, and Hohner electric pianos—with all the 
character and quirks of the originals.”3 Its interface seeks to reproduce the physical 
reference to Michael Praetorius’s term organographia (see n. 6 below), Bessaraboff used the term 
to refer to “the scientiﬁ c and engineering aspects of musical instruments.” See Oler, “Deﬁ nition of 
Organology,” Galpin Society Journal 23 (1970): 170– 4. The Galpin Society, dedicated to the study of 
instruments and still ﬂ ourishing today, was founded in the same decade that Bessaraboff’s study was 
published. On the history of scientiﬁ c instruments, see Albert van Helden and Thomas L. Hankins, 
eds., Instruments, vol. 9 of Osiris, 2nd ser. (1994).
2 “Logic Pro,” Apple, http:// www .apple .com/ logicpro/ top- features/ (accessed 13 Apr. 2013). 
3 Ibid. Logic Pro is one of a number of forms of software displaying this kind of “technostalgia.” The 
new Peter Vogel CMI iPad app, for example, allows the user to recreate the experience of working with 
the original Fairlight Computer Musical Instrument sampler, right down to setting the fail rate of the 
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characteristics of mixers, pedal boards, and drum machines: the user can still turn 
virtual knobs and dials and press virtual buttons—a feature that is surely as much 
a concession to nostalgia as it is a useful way of bridging the gap between physical 
device and software. Logic Pro transforms its embedded objects. Within this world, 
a guitar is no longer a physical prosthesis for the performer, liberating forms of ar-
tistic expression while simultaneously circumscribing the performer’s range through 
its technical speciﬁ cations and limitations. In Logic Pro, the instrument becomes 
synonymous with its effects; it becomes, as it were, purely aesthetic—a particular 
texture, a timbre, as well as a cultural resonance that can be conjured up with a few 
clicks. We see and hear the original instrument, as a material object, in new ways. 
The metamorphosis from physical objects to digital plug- ins draws attention to the 
 historicity of Logic Pro’s new and old instruments; instruments have life histories, 
and multifaceted and changeable personalities.
Similar observations about the re- mediation of scientiﬁ c instruments are inescap-
able. In contemporary sciences, computer- based models and simulations of pro-
cesses at subatomic, molecular, physiological, cerebral, geological, or astrophysical 
scales illustrate a growing power of digital imitation; unprecedently massive new 
data sets are compiled and subjected to automatic analysis; new ﬁ elds, such as bio-
informatics, come into being thanks to comparatively easy access to vast computing 
power.4 Ultimately, every aspect of laboratory life—from experiment, visualization, 
and data storage and processing to communication among lab members, including 
scheduling, collaboration, and publishing—has been transformed by the presence of 
computers. The tools that made up the previous infrastructure and material backdrop 
of the lab have been replicated, subtly altered, and amalgamated into layered and net-
worked instruments of instruments.
The fact that the arts and the sciences now share so many aspects of their technical 
infrastructure results in isomorphic logics, shared working strategies, and common 
imaginaries between them. It has also made it easier to recognize earlier conver-
gences between the ﬁ elds and to ﬁ nd in them compelling anticipations of our own 
moment, leading to reﬂ ection on the ways in which instruments have facilitated in-
tersections between the ﬁ ne arts and the sciences, as well as the different ways they 
have been understood in relation to humans. While we could build on a growing body 
of work that juxtaposes the sciences with the visual arts, the instruments of science 
and music in many ways form a more intriguing pair.5 While visual art objects are 
records of past work with paint, pencil, canvas, or stone, for there to be music at all, 
the instrument has to be currently at work (at least, that was the case until the arrival 
ﬂ oppy- disk reader. On the historical performance and re- creation of electroacoustic technologies, see 
Joseph Auner, “Wanted Dead and Alive: Historical Performance Practice and Electro- acoustic Music 
from Abbey Road to IRCAM,” in Communicating about Music: A Festschrift for Jane Bernstein, ed. 
Roberta Marvin and Craig Monson (Rochester, forthcoming).
4 In addition to the explosion of writings seen since 2012 on “big data” (e.g., Steve Lohr, “The Age 
of Big Data,” Sunday Review, New York Times, 11 Feb. 2012), see the inﬂ uential statements of Jim 
Gray in The Fourth Paradigm: Data- Intensive Scientiﬁ c Discovery, ed. Tony Hey, Stewart Tansley, 
and Kristen Tolle (Redmond, Wash., 2009); for critical discussion, see Chris Kelty, Lilly Irani, and 
Nick Seaver, eds., Crowds and Clouds, issue no. 2 of Limn, http:// limn.it/ issue/ 02/ (accessed 29 Sept. 
2012).
5 For studies of correlations between visual and acoustic media in nineteenth- and twentieth- century 
arts and sciences, see Mara Mills and John Tresch, eds., Audio/ Visual, vol. 43 of Grey Room (Spring 
2011). 
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of automatic recording). Further, from Pythagoras onward there has been a supposi-
tion of unity between science and music. At the same time, there is reason to think 
of these ﬁ elds as complementary: musical instruments express the inner states of 
the composer or the performer, moving outward from the mind to the world, while 
scientiﬁ c instruments bring external states of the world into the consciousness of 
observers, moving from the world to the mind. Given the current acute sense of the 
ways in which new instruments of communication and representation are changing 
our modes of thinking, arguing, and perceiving, the time is ripe for trying to get his-
torical perspective on these changes, by means of a comparative study of instruments 
in different ﬁ elds.
Part of our inspiration comes from Renaissance texts such as Sebastian Virdung’s 
Musica getutscht und ausgezogen (1511) and Michael Praetorius’s Syntagma Mu-
sicum (1618).6 These organographical treatises catalogued a wide range of musical 
instruments in a systematic fashion, organizing them into families according to their 
construction and use. The same classifying impulse lies behind the present article, 
but our focus is broader in that we also include scientiﬁ c instruments and attend to 
historical differences. We are aiming at an analysis—and perhaps a new taxonomy—
of the ways people (primarily in the West) have understood instruments’ action and 
their bearing on humans. In what follows, we will sketch some of the features that 
might deﬁ ne a systematic study of the natures, uses, degrees of agency, and ends of 
instruments in different ﬁ elds and at different times: a new organology.
If all we were after were a historical inventory of instruments, the ﬁ rst task would 
be to assemble materials. In the case of music, we would consider taxonomies, or-
ganologies, orchestration treatises, collection guides, and museum inventories. For 
science, we would turn to similar instrumental compendia: laboratory manuals, cabi-
nets de physique, and kits for calibrating instruments and setting up laboratories, 
as well as the correspondence exchanged between different observatories and labs 
about coordinating and standardizing equipment. But we are aiming at something 
more. We want to think about instruments as actors or tools with variable ranges of 
activity, with changing constructions and deﬁ nitions, and with different locations in 
both technical and social formations. We want to ask, What aspects of instruments 
have been variable (or have been seen to be), and what were the consequences of that 
variation? What were the larger arrangements of technology, social roles, and ele-
ments of the natural world (breath, electricity, the air, metal, biological specimens) 
into which particular instruments were woven? How was their action understood: 
Were they neutral vehicles for human intention or external nature, or did they trans-
mute or modify the impulses they carried along? What larger projects, goals, or con-
ceptions of either the arts or sciences, or both, did they help to articulate?
To get at these differences and similarities, we will take a lesson from a prominent 
focus of attention in recent history of science: the different ethical ideals at work in 
scientiﬁ c research. In parallel with studies of “epistemic virtues” and the ethics of the 
knowing subject, we propose as a thought experiment—one that will surely provide 
more questions than answers—a comparative study of the ethics of instruments.
6 Virdung’s work is the earliest printed treatise on instruments; for more information, see Beth Bul-
lard’s translation, Musica getutscht: A Treatise on Musical Instruments (Cambridge, 1993). The term 
“organology” derives in part from the second volume of Praetorius’s Syntagma Musicum, entitled De 
Organographia, which was devoted to descriptions of musical instruments. 
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THE ETHICS OF INSTRUMENTS
Instruments are integrated in diverse ways with human activities; they also inﬂ u-
ence understandings of human conduct and freedom. In thinking about instruments 
as having an ethical dimension, our approach dovetails with recent attempts to char-
acterize moments in the history of science by the epistemic virtues that have guided 
the pursuit of natural knowledge.7 Ethics, in such works, turns out to be important for 
epistemology: knowledge appears not merely as a set of ideas or even practices, but 
as a form of life, with distinct ideals, moral codes, activities, and understandings of 
the self.8 This broadened conception of ethics as a form of life resonates with com-
parative studies and histories of the self (e.g., by Marcel Mauss, or more recently by 
Charles Taylor and Jerrold Siegel).9 It also takes inspiration from the later works of 
Michel Foucault.
In the works published toward the end of his life, Foucault reframed ethics as es-
sentially concerned with the self’s relation to the self. He saw this relation as consist-
ing of four dimensions: an ethical substance, or the part of the self understood to be 
addressed by ethics, including the relevant domains of activity (economic exchange, 
food, sex, vocation, etc.); a mode of subjection, or the relation of the subject to explicit 
codes of conduct, rules, and obligations; the ethical work, or the activities through 
which the subject is constituted; and ﬁ nally the telos, or the ends toward which this 
activity is directed.10 Foucault laid particular emphasis on the idea of ethics as an 
aestheticization of existence: in his interpretation of texts from ancient Greece and 
the Hellenistic period, he saw the care of the self (in ascetic practices such as self- 
examination and journal keeping) as guided by the ideal of creating a beautiful life. 
In late interviews and occasional pieces he presented more recent ethical constel-
lations, such as Baudelaire’s theorization of dandyism in the 1860s and attempts to 
refashion friendship as the basis of gay life in the 1970s, as modern updates of the 
view of ethics as an aesthetics of existence. Ethics was less concerned with moral 
proscriptions than the practices and ideals through which one constituted oneself as a 
free subject and as a work of art.11
Yet Foucault’s conception of the ethical telos of ancient philosophy has been criti-
cized as too narrow. According to Pierre Hadot, his focus on aesthetics obscured the 
7 See, e.g., Peter Galison and Lorraine Daston, Objectivity (New York, 2007); Matthew Jones, The 
Good Life in the Scientiﬁ c Revolution (Chicago, 2004).
8 For Daston and Galison, ethical conduct is “a way of being in the world, for a group or individuals” 
(Objectivity [cit. n. 7], 40). 
9 Mauss, “A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person; The Notion of Self,” in The 
Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, ed. Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins, 
and Steven Lukes (Cambridge, 1985), 1– 25; Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); Siegel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western 
Europe since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 2005).
10 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, vol. 2, The Use of Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New 
York, 1990).
11 “The idea of morality as obedience to a code of rules is now disappearing, has already disap-
peared. And to this absence of morality corresponds, must correspond, the search for an aesthetics 
of existence.” Michel Foucault, “An Aesthetics of Existence,” in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: In-
terviews and Other Writings, ed. Lawrence Kritzman (New York, 1988), 49; see also his interview 
entitled “Friendship as a Way of Life” in Foucault Live: Interviews, 1961– 1984 (New York, 1996), 
203– 7, and his essay “What Is Enlightenment?” in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New 
York, 1984), 32– 50. For a more recent, hilarious theorization of dandyism, see Lord Breaulove Swells 
Whimsy, The Affected Provincial’s Companion, vol. 1 (New York, 2006).
 TOWARD A NEW ORGANOLOGY 283
Epicurean and Stoic understanding of ascetic practices as means of situating oneself 
in the universal order and accessing a “cosmic consciousness” as embodied in the ﬁ g-
ure of the sage.12 While Foucault reframed ethics as a transhistorical dandyism, Pla-
tonic and Stoic self- fashioning aimed instead at placing the individual into harmony 
with the order of the universe—which is not necessarily the same thing. For ancient 
philosophy, ethics was closely tied to cosmology.13 We might further add the obvious 
point that in all standard accounts, ethics bears upon one’s conduct toward family, 
friends, allies, and enemies; it involves the self’s relation not only to the self, but to 
others. Following Hadot, then, we need to expand Foucault’s conception of ethics to 
include further contexts of ethical conceptualization and activity: the self’s relation 
to the cosmos or nature, and the self’s relation to other selves.
Modiﬁ ed in these ways, Foucault’s later works provide a useful, multidimensional 
framework for comparing ethical systems. But what if we were to go one step fur-
ther, and apply this framework not only to humans—in their capacities as active and 
knowing subjects—but to the instruments with which humans engage as they create 
knowledge and other cultural products? What if we shift our gaze from the relations 
between self and self, and self and nature (as traditionally explored in ethics and epis-
temology), to consider the variable relations between selves and instruments, tools, 
and machines? What then comes to light is a framework for studying the historical 
variations in an ethics of instruments—a history that parallels and intersects that of 
ethics and of the knowing subject. A comparative ethics of scientiﬁ c instruments 
could also be juxtaposed with the relations of selves and instruments found in ﬁ elds 
other than science; for instance, in music.
Such a project requires us to reckon with the many different ways in which in-
struments, tools, and machines have been understood. We need to expand our view 
beyond the standard notion of the tool as utilitarian and passive, and beyond the 
ideal of the machine as embodying inhuman precision and standardization—the uni-
form, predictable, sharp- edged ideal underlying “mechanical objectivity.”14 Across 
time and in different contexts, instruments and machines have changed in their mate-
rial conﬁ guration, their mode of activity, their relations to other objects and people, 
and their aims. These changes have had consequences for how humans understand 
themselves. Upending the view of technical progress as increasing domination over 
nature, for instance, Thoreau famously said, “We do not ride on the railroad, it rides 
upon us.” Are tools understood as granting us mastery, or are they seen as reducing 
us to cogs in what Lewis Mumford called the “megamachine”?15 Or, alternatively, 
are they seen as establishing a complicated balance, weaving us into the fabric of a 
second nature? The answers to these questions will depend on the era, the instrument, 
and the ﬁ eld.
To give precision and reach to the notion of an ethics of instruments, we propose 
the following analytical categories. Though they are inspired by the four axes that 
12 See Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life (Oxford, 1995); discussion in Arnold Davidson, “Ethics 
as Ascetics: Foucault, the History of Ethics, and Ancient Thought,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Foucault, 2nd ed., ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge, 2005): 123– 48. 
13 In The Good Life (cit. n. 7) Matthew Jones shows how this was also the case for early modern 
natural philosophers.
14 See Daston and Galison, Objectivity (cit. n. 7).
15 Henry David Thoreau, Walden; or, Life in the Woods (1854), in A Week on the Concord and Mer-
rimack Rivers, Walden, The Maine Woods, Cape Cod (New York, 1985), 396; Mumford, Technics and 
Human Development, vol. 1 of The Myth of the Machine (New York, 1971). 
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made up Foucault’s analysis of the self’s relation to the self, we have tweaked and 
tuned them in order to apply them to instruments. An instrument’s ethics, we suggest, 
may be analyzed according to the following categories:
1. The material disposition of the instrument: the nature and conﬁ guration of its 
elements, and the materials and parts that make it up. Also, and perhaps most im-
portant, this disposition is deﬁ ned by which parts are seen as necessary to make 
the object an instrument of a certain type, and which may be varied to alter its 
speciﬁ c action. (This corresponds to what Foucault called the ethical substance, 
that part of the self made an object for moral reﬂ ection.)
2. The instrument’s mode of mediation: whether its action is considered to be au-
tonomous or passive, modifying or transparent, hidden or visible (corresponding 
to Foucault’s ethical activity, the work conducted to make oneself a subject of 
ethics).
3. The map of mediations of which the instrument is a part. Such maps, joining 
together a number of distinct elements, may be rather complex: in music they in-
clude air, sound, composers, players, other instruments, and listeners, as well as 
orchestration treatises and rules of composition; in the sciences they include the 
phenomena being investigated, the observer or experimenter, and other elements 
in the experimental system, as well as rules of method, laboratory protocols, 
scientiﬁ c institutions, and patterns of moving between observation and general-
ization. (This category relates to what Foucault calls the mode of subjection, or 
the subject’s relation to rules or obligations.)
4. The telos of an instrument’s activity, or its ends (Foucault uses the same term 
to describe the goal of ethical work). What is the nature of the enterprise within 
which the instrument is deployed; what are its social contexts and uses, and 
the social, economic, and political relations they express, reinforce, or perhaps 
modify? At the level of telos we might also want to bring in broader conceptions 
of the goals attributed to instruments (much as Hadot suggested in his critique of 
Foucault mentioned above): not the instrument’s relation to itself but its relation 
to its users and those exposed to its products, as well as its impact on the entire 
collective. Furthermore, we might consider the relationship an instrument is seen 
to entertain with the natural order, with the cosmos as a whole.
This approach means that we will be applying concepts to nonhuman objects that are 
usually attributed to humans. Exploring the different forms and degrees of agency at-
tributed to instruments suggests that the qualities of sentience, activity, and intention 
might not always belong only to humans but also to objects often classed as inani-
mate, including machines and instruments.16 Yet, as Bruno Latour has argued, an am-
bivalence between human agency and the agency of machines is a common theme in 
considerations of technological inventions of all kinds: “The label ‘inhuman’ applied 
to techniques simply overlooks translation mechanisms and the many choices that 
exist for ﬁ guring or deﬁ guring, personifying or abstracting, embodying or disem-
16 Such a conception builds on recent interrogations of the liveliness of matter; e.g., Bill Brown, 
“Thing Theory,” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 1 (2001): 1– 22; Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political 
Ecology of Things (Durham, N.C., 2010); Manuel De Landa, A Thousand Years of Non- linear History 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2000).
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bodying actors. When we say that [technologies] are ‘mere automatisms,’ we project 
as much as when we say they are ‘loving creatures’; the only difference is that the 
latter is an anthropomorphism and the former a technomorphism.”17 If instruments 
are frequently accused of making humans act mechanically, why should we not take 
seriously instruments’ oft- noted lifelike capacities?
The following pages elaborate and illustrate the four categories we have proposed 
as steps toward a new taxonomy—a classiﬁ catory scheme for ordering the long series 
of scientiﬁ c instruments and the long series of musical instruments. Our examples 
are drawn from medieval and early modern settings as well as from the Enlighten-
ment, romanticism, industrial modernity, and postmodernity. If this kaleidoscopic 
view is somewhat disorienting, so much the better: we hope that our instrument- 
focused approach to the conjunctions of music and science will allow readers to see 
(and hear) things from a new angle. At the very least, the organological framework 
we develop should be a provocation to thinking about distinct aspects of the instru-
ments at work in both of these ﬁ elds. In addition, we see this analysis as providing 
the grounds for the construction of parallel historical series for scientiﬁ c and musi-
cal instruments, and, eventually, for a comparison between them. In other words, we 
hope to address such questions as, What do the ways in which people built, used, 
and thought about musical instruments in a given period tell us about the scien-
tiﬁ c instruments in the same period, and vice versa? Where do historically speciﬁ c 
ways of thinking about scientiﬁ c instruments converge with those for musical in-
struments? More broadly, what do those interactions tell us about the changing re-
lationships between science and the arts, or about the changing relationships among 
humans, nature, and technology? While answers to such questions must lie in the 
future, throughout the following discussion of the four categories that make up an 
ethics of instruments—material disposition, mode of mediation, map of mediations, 
and telos—certain suggestions along these lines should be apparent, and more will 
be sketched in the conclusion.
MATERIAL DISPOSITION: MICROSCOPE, TELESCOPE, KEYBOARD
In examining the material disposition of an instrument, we ask, What is the instru-
ment made of, and how are its components arranged? Its conﬁ guration of parts might 
change, even as the same name is applied to it. Take for example the microscope. 
From early designs even preceding Robert Hooke’s, microscopes involved lenses and 
mirrors. Their aim was to enlarge visual access to the very small, and they worked 
by deviating rays of light to magnify the image of an object as it reached the eye. In 
contrast, the electron microscope, which ﬁ rst appeared in the 1930s, projects a ray 
of electrons through a thin slice of the object being observed; these are then cap-
tured on photographic ﬁ lm. Because electrons have much shorter wavelengths than 
the photons of visible light, they grasp much ﬁ ner textures. Similarly, the scanning 
electron microscope sends a highly focused beam across an object’s surface; as the 
electrons’ energy is transformed, it is recorded as the basis for a reconstruction of 
spatial features. Though these instruments share a name, the electron microscope—
17 Latour, “Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts,” in Shap-
ing Technology, Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, ed. Wiebe Bijker and John Law 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 225– 58, on 241.
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as well as nanotechnology’s deﬁ ning instrument, the scanning tunneling microscope 
(or STM)—are constructed and function according to principles quite distinct from 
the lenses and luminous optics of the instruments originally called “microscopes.”18
The telescope has undergone a comparable evolution.19 From Roger Bacon’s 
thirteenth- century explorations with “seeing stones” to Newton’s reﬂ ecting tele-
scope, the optics of natural light and vision were put to work in making very distant 
objects close, again by bending rays of light to expand the visible image. Improve-
ments in lenses and increases in scale continued apace. In the twentieth century, new 
telescopes appeared that no longer used visible light as their medium. In 1931, radio 
waves emitted from the Milky Way were detected, and the radio telescope, with its 
characteristic disk pointed at the sky, became a deﬁ ning feature of the modern obser-
vatory. Infrared rays are tracked by telescopes usually placed on mountaintops, and 
ultraviolet and gamma- ray telescopes are attached to satellites; some, like the Hub-
ble, travel untethered through space. Although these instruments often result in visual 
images—colored and shaded according to the conventions of romantic landscape 
painting—these are post hoc constructions, visual mappings of the vast quantities of 
data generated by automatic sweeps of the sky, given a wide berth for selection and 
modiﬁ cation by their creators.20
Beyond their smaller scale, cost, energy inputs, and technical complexity, the 
underlying physical processes at work in the early microscope and telescope were 
completely different from those of their more recent successors: direct ocular obser-
vation versus automatic collection of electromagnetic radiation or capture of electron 
beams and their subsequent statistical analysis.21 Microscopes and telescopes each 
offer an example of an instrument that undergoes profound transformations at the 
level of its material disposition—what it is made of, which aspects of the external 
world it engages with, how it functions materially—while remaining an instrument 
of the same kind.
In contrast, the material disposition of an instrument, or some key part of it, might 
remain basically constant over time, while the instrument, as it combines with other 
elements, becomes an entirely new tool used for different functions. The keyboard, 
for instance, offers an example of an enduring interface that has been attached to a 
wide range of technical apparatuses. The basic concept—an instrument controlled 
by a series of levers operated by ﬁ ngertip pressure—is ancient. Within music, it has 
been part of the organ, harpsichord, clavichord, piano, and synthesizer, as well as 
shorter- lived inventions whose names are largely forgotten today. Medieval key-
18 Jutta Schickore, The Microscope and the Eye: A History of Reﬂ ections, 1740– 1870 (Chicago, 
2007); William Croft, Under the Microscope: A Brief History of Microscopy (Singapore, 2006); Cyrus 
Mody, Instrumental Community: Probe Microscopy and the Path to Nanotechnology (Cambridge, 
Mass., 2011). 
19 Henry King, The History of the Telescope (New York, 2011); Alison Morrison- Low, Sven Dupré, 
Stephen Johnston, and Giorgio Strano, eds., From Earth- Bound to Satellite: Telescope, Skills and 
Networks (Leiden, 2011).
20 Elizabeth Kessler, Picturing the Cosmos: Hubble Space Telescope Images and the Astronomical 
Sublime (Minneapolis, 2012).
21 In this respect, astronomy resembles the many other ﬁ elds of science that have been transformed 
in the last decade and a half by their heavy reliance on automatic data collection and algorithmic data 
mining. See the discussion in the case of meteorology and more generally in Paul Edwards, A Vast 
Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming (Cambridge, Mass., 
2011), and, more programmatically, in Hey, Tansley, and Tolle, Fourth Paradigm (cit. n. 4). 
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boards were, by and large, diatonic—that is, they had seven or eight pitches to an oc-
tave. The keyboard layout we know today in the modern piano, which comprises the 
twelve pitches of the chromatic scale, has existed since the ﬁ fteenth century.
Throughout history, various inventors have attempted to alter the traditional de-
sign, creating keyboards that move away from C major as the center, use additional 
keys that allow microtonal music, or are arranged in different conﬁ gurations un-
derstood to allow for easier transposition or more ergonomic playing, but such ef-
forts have remained experimental. The interface of the keyboard has structured in 
profound ways inventors’ conceptions of new instruments and machines. The late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed a ﬂ urry of activity aimed at in-
venting an instrument to capture an idealized “voice of nature”—a sweet, nuanced 
sound that would resemble human singing. Benjamin Franklin’s glass harmonica 
(invented in 1761), a series of tuned glass bowls, played directly with moistened ﬁ n-
gertips and threaded on a rod that the performer turned with a foot treadle, spurred 
this activity. The shortcomings of Franklin’s mechanism—its inability to play rapid 
passages, sluggish response time, and nasty habit of making performers sick—in-
spired later inventors to combine the glass harmonica’s ethereal tones with a more 
manageable interface. And that interface was, for most inventors, the standard key-
board: from Ernst Florens Friedrich Chladni’s clavicylinder to the harmonichord of 
Johann Gottfried and Johann Friedrich Kaufmann, instruments of this period con-
tained wildly differing mechanisms, all accessed by means of a keyboard. It was 
precisely the presence of the keyboard that made these instruments accessible to 
the public imagination.22 Indeed, for an instrument inventor not to use a keyboard 
for a complex new instrument required some justiﬁ cation. Synthesizer pioneer Don 
 Buchla, for example, rejected using a keyboard interface for his 1970 Music Box. “A 
keyboard is dictatorial,” he argued. “When you’ve got a black and white keyboard 
there it’s hard to play anything but keyboard music. And when there’s not a black and 
white  keyboard you get into the knobs and the wires and the interconnections and the 
timbres, and you get involved in many other aspects of the music, and it’s a far more 
experimental way.”23 Trevor Pinch and Frank Trocco have shown how Robert Moog 
also initially resisted ﬁ tting his synthesizer with a keyboard until his collaborator 
Herb Deutsch convinced him to reconsider.24
But the keyboard helped to structure nonmusical instruments as well. In the early 
1840s, the interface of the ﬁ rst machines for mechanically composing and distribut-
ing type was directly modeled on the piano keyboard; many of these devices were 
called “pianotypes.” While this name made the musical roots of these devices ex-
plicit, the lever systems of many early typewriters did not look much like pianos, 
arranging keys in circular, spherical, and semicircular layouts. However, Samuel W. 
Francis based the action of his typewriter on that of the mid- nineteenth- century 
 piano, and the Remington typewriter followed this lead. Even when the keyboard did 
22 On these inventions, see Emily I. Dolan, “E. T. A. Hoffmann and the Ethereal Technologies of 
‘Nature Music,’ ” Eighteenth- Century Music 5, no. 1 (2008): 7– 26; Myles Jackson discusses the sci-
entiﬁ c context of some of these instruments in Harmonious Triads: Physicians, Musicians, and In-
strument Makers in Nineteenth- Century Germany (Cambridge, Mass., 2006).
23 Quoted in Trevor Pinch and Frank Trocco, Analog Days: The Invention and Impact of the Moog 
Synthesizer (Cambridge, Mass., 2002), 44.
24 Ibid., 59.
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not directly replicate the layout of a piano, skills could transfer from one domain to 
the other. In a late nineteenth- century history of the still rapidly developing machine, 
P. G. Hubert reported that
the most elaborate typewriter ever constructed was that made a few months ago for little 
Joseph Hofmann, the boy pianist. . . . After less than two hours’ practice, he wrote letters 
in several languages to friends in different parts of the world, who might not yet know 
what a typewriter is.25
Hofmann (1876– 1957) was a child prodigy and one of the great pianists of the 
twentieth century; his purported ability to master typing in two hours testiﬁ ed to his 
general virtuosic dexterity. But the connection existed even for nonvirtuosi. Those 
skilled at the piano were better positioned to develop dexterity on writing machines, 
a fact with important social consequences: because the pianotype was less physically 
taxing than previous techniques of text composition, women could take over the craft 
at lower wages—replacing skilled male workers.26 Likewise, Kittler has argued that 
the resemblance between piano and typewriter enabled women to transition from lei-
sured domestic music making into paid secretarial work. This connection was clear 
to those witnessing the birth of the female clerk in the nineteenth century. Writing in 
1895, two German economists remarked:
Today, the typist has evolved into a kind of type: she is generally very high in demand 
and is the ruling queen in this domain not only in America but in Germany as well. It may 
come as a surprise to ﬁ nd a practical use for what has become a veritable plague across 
the country, namely piano lessons for young girls: the resultant dexterity is very useful 
for the operation of the typewriter. Rapid typing on it can be achieved only through the 
dexterous use of all ﬁ ngers.27
The history of the keyboard helps raise a series of questions about instruments’ 
material dispositions. What conditions are necessary for a new instrument to suc-
ceed? How are the material elements of one instrument reterritorialized onto new 
instruments? Likewise, the history of the microscope and telescope lead us to ask, 
What must stay the same for an instrument to remain the same kind of thing over 
time? How much variation is possible within a single family of instruments, and 
along which dimensions? At what point have the underlying mechanics and mode of 
function shifted such that we can no longer call the instrument by the same name as 
its precursors?
MODE OF MEDIATION: WHO’S PLAYING WHOM?
In January 2011, the renowned guitarist and composer Marc Ribot held a month-
long residency at Le Poisson Rouge in Manhattan. Those in attendance watched Ri-
bot transition from charismatic virtuoso, single- handedly commanding attention, to 
thoughtful ensemble member, self- effacingly attuned to the needs of the group. Even 
25 Hubert, “The Typewriter; Its Growth and Uses,” North American Review 146, no. 379 (1888) 
[unpaginated]. 
26 François Jarrige, “Le mauvais genre de la machine,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 
54 (2007): 193– 221.
27 Quoted in Friedrich A. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop- Young 
and Michael Wutz (Stanford, Calif., 1999): 194– 5.
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more striking, however, was his relationship to his instrument: at times the guitar ap-
peared as a seamless extension of his body, utterly under his control; other times, he 
made the separation between performer and instrument clear, cradling the guitar in 
his arms like he was embracing another being. He often seemed to meet the instru-
ment halfway, grappling with the guitar’s own agency. This ﬂ uidity calls attention to 
the different modes of mediation that may be at work when a user interacts with an 
instrument. Any history of instruments must also account for their changing forms of 
agency and visibility. Do we understand a given instrument within a given context as 
passive and obedient to the hand of the user, or does it appear as active, occasionally 
beyond the user’s complete control? How much does the instrument control the user, 
and vice versa?
Different historical periods and cultural settings have offered starkly contrasting 
answers to these questions. In the case of the late Enlightenment and the roman-
tic era, intriguing connections between the agency of musical and scientiﬁ c instru-
ments abounded. The early part of the career of the famed astronomer William Her-
schel (1738– 1822) was spent amid not telescopes but musical instruments. Born in 
 Hanover, he worked as an oboist and violinist for the Hanover Guards. Abandoning 
the post and its harsh conditions, he performed and composed music outside London, 
eventually securing a position as organist at the Octagon Chapel in Bath in 1766. He 
composed over two dozen symphonies, numerous concertos, chamber music, music 
for keyboard, and vocal works. A versatile instrumentalist, in January 1787 he per-
formed concertos in Bath for both oboe and violin and a sonata for the harpsichord. 
The autograph manuscripts of his oboe concertos contain an unusual number of nu-
anced and precise performance indications.
During the 1770s, Herschel’s astronomical interests grew. He began to construct 
his own telescopes and stands, meticulously grinding his own lenses; he collaborated 
with his sister Caroline, whose childhood encounter with typhus left her unmarriage-
able in the eyes of her parents.28 In 1781, Herschel realized that the sidereal object he 
had thought was perhaps a comet was actually a planet. He named the planet Geor-
gium Sidus; only later (perhaps unfortunately) was it renamed Uranus. After this dis-
covery, King George awarded Herschel an annual salary, allowing him to concentrate 
entirely on astronomy. Yet elements of his musical career persisted. Connecting his 
musical and astronomical endeavors was the notion of practice. In a letter from 1782, 
Herschel wrote:
I do not suppose there are many persons who could ever ﬁ nd a star with my power of 
6,450, much less keep it, if they found it. Seeing is in some respects an art, which must 
be learnt. To make a person see with such a power is nearly the same as if I were asked to 
make him play one of Handel’s fugues on the organ. Many a night have I been practising 
to see, and it would be strange if one did not acquire a certain dexterity by such constant 
practice.29
Looking through a telescope required the same kind of dedicated practice as the per-
formance of fugues at a keyboard. Herschel’s skill in constructing instruments rein-
28 See Michael Hoskin, Discoverers of the Universe: William and Caroline Herschel (Princeton, 
N.J., 2011). 
29 Herschel to Dr. William Watson, 7 Jan. 1782, in Constance Lubbock, The Herschel Chronicle: The 
Life- Story of William Herschel and His Sister Caroline Herschel (New York, 1933), 99– 101, on 101.
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forced his artful seeing. His telescopes were neither wholly active nor entirely pas-
sive instruments: each new and larger telescope that he constructed altered what he 
saw and how he understood what he saw (a fact crucial to his understanding of nebu-
lae as progressively developing cloudlike material).30
Herschel’s view of instrumental work as an intimate, skillful collaboration was 
theorized in quasi- biological terms a generation later by the Prussian polymath 
 Alexander von Humboldt, who saw scientiﬁ c instruments as outgrowths of human 
capacities:
The creation of new organs (instruments of observation) increases the intellectual and 
not infrequently the physical powers of man. More rapid than light, the closed electric 
current conveys thought and will to the remotest distance. Forces, whose silent operation 
in elementary nature, and in the delicate cells of organic tissues, still escape our sense, 
will, when recognized, employed, and awakened to higher activity, at some future time 
enter within the sphere of the endless chain of means which enable man to subject to his 
control separate domains of nature, and to approximate to a more animated recognition 
of the Universe as a Whole.31
The instrument merges with and extends our senses, and unites us in thought and in 
action with the cosmos. Both Herschel and Humboldt presented the use of instru-
ments as a “dance of agency” akin to that which Andrew Pickering describes as “the 
mangle of practice.”32
Yet the reciprocal agency at work in the mechanical romanticism of Herschel and 
Humboldt is certainly not the only way in which the activity of instruments has been 
understood. One classic understanding is of the instrument as entirely passive. In 
the case of music, one thinks of instruments perfectly responsive to the impulses of 
performers. Science maintains the dream of the “transparent” instrument, one that 
renders, in a known and entirely predictable way, the givens of nature. In the late 
eighteenth century, the balance, as used across diverse sciences (in the form of scales, 
calorimeters, and economic balance sheets), implied an equivalence of inputs and 
outputs, with no interference by the instrument.33 The nineteenth- century scientiﬁ c 
ideal of “mechanical objectivity,” which focused on devices that bypassed the pecu-
liarities of human intentions and will, likewise assumed that machines would pas-
sively transmit the world out there, a mediation that in no way altered the phenom-
enon being observed.
At the opposite extreme we ﬁ nd expressions of concern that the unsought agency 
of an instrument will upset the delicate equilibrium between observer and world: the 
history of twentieth- century science evidences constant worry about the artifacts and 
noise produced by observing machines, from bubble chambers to functional mag-
netic resonance imaging machines (fMRIs)—traces not of the object being stud-
ied but of the experimental apparatus itself. In music, the recurring ﬁ gure of a self- 
30 See Simon Schaffer, “Herschel in Bedlam: Natural History and Stellar Astronomy,” British Jour-
nal for the History of Science 13, no. 3 (1980): 211– 39.
31 Humboldt, Cosmos: A Sketch of a Physical Description of the Universe, vol. 2, trans. E. C. Otté 
(London, 1849), 742. Humboldt presented instruments as active organs throughout Cosmos; he de-
scribed the telescope as having “exercised an inﬂ uence similar to some great and sudden event” (739).
32 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science (Chicago, 1995).
33 Norton Wise, “Mediations: Enlightenment Balancing Acts; or, The Technology of Rationalism,” 
in World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, ed. P. Horwich (Cambridge, Mass., 
1993), 207– 56.
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playing instrument frequently involves diabolical deals, magical ﬂ utes, and uncanny 
hunting horns; the negative associations of this myth are active today in denuncia-
tions of lip- synched performances as soulless and robotic.34 Daft Punk—a French 
electronic dance music duo who perform in helmets making them look like robots—
make intriguing sport of this topos. Their 2006/ 7 Alive tour featured synchronized 
light patterns, beats, and vocoder phrases emanating from a giant illuminated pyra-
mid, a spectacle whose preprogrammed nature in no way diminished the crowds’ 
delight. Charisma and spontaneity were paradoxically presented as being on the side 
of the machine, provoking an ironic recognition that all participants in the event —
performers, audience members, and technical apparatus—were “human after all,” as 
in the title of Daft Punk’s 2005 album.
In performance, agency may also shift among different instruments working to-
gether. In a jazz session’s call- and- response and turn taking, one instrumentalist 
moves forward as soloist, improvising freely, while the other members of the combo 
maintain a steady background; the soloist retreats and a member of the background 
comes forward to work a new melodic line. The cuing required for taking turns in-
volves an intersubjectivity that is all the more complex the more an ensemble tends 
toward the outer limits of free jazz, where all improvise at once.35 In a scientiﬁ c ex-
periment, the management of agency is also at a premium. The ideal of a statistical 
experiment, for instance, involves control over the agency of all elements except one: 
the independent variable. This widely held conception of the mode of mediation in 
the elements of an experimental system (with multiple controlled variables, a single 
independent variable, and a single dependent variable) arises from the conjunction 
of early nineteenth- century writings on scientiﬁ c method with late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth- century statistics. A new organology would explore the historicity of 
this and related formulations of instruments’ modes of mediation, examining the pre-
vailing understandings and evaluations of instruments’ degree of agency in a given 
period and ﬁ eld.
MAP OF MEDIATIONS: EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEMS, ORCHESTRATION
So far, we’ve considered the elements that make up an instrument and their different 
possible arrangements; we’ve thought about whether instruments are seen as acting 
under their own impulses, or if they are entirely dependent on an outside agent, be it 
the human using them or some other force. A third dimension along which we can 
analyze and compare instruments in action is the location they occupy with regard 
to other elements: other instruments, the range of users involved with them, their ob-
jects, their audiences. In parallel with Foucault’s notion of a mode of subjection—the 
subject’s relation to rules and external obligations—for an instrument, this is a map 
of mediations.
34 See, e.g., E. T. A. Hoffmann’s short story “Der Sandmann” (1816) as translated by E. F. Bleiler in 
The Best Tales of Hoffmann (New York, 1979), 183– 214. The story involves Olimpia, a piano- playing 
and deceivingly lifelike automaton who leads to the horriﬁ c downfall of the protagonist; Lisa Morales, 
“Ashlee Simpson and That Lip- Syncing Feeling,” Washington Post, 26 Oct. 2004. 
35 Ornette Coleman, Free Jazz: A Collective Improvisation, Atlantic SD 1364, 1961, 33⅓ rpm; John 
Litweiler, The Freedom Principle: Jazz after 1958 (New York, 1984). See also Arnold Davidson’s 
keynote lecture, “Improvisation as Ethical Form,” for the symposium “Improvisation and Ethics: A 
Conversation,” held at Columbia University 13 Nov. 2008. The talk is available through Jazz Studies 
Online: http:// jazzstudiesonline .org/ ?q=node/ 987 (accessed 29 Sept. 2012).
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The history of science of the past thirty years has made the map of mediations ar-
ticulated by an instrument a central topic. The ways in which points of a map may 
be adjusted, black- boxed, and revised are signaled clearly by Hans Jörg Rheinberg-
er’s “experimental system,” which he deﬁ nes as a “basic unit of experimental ac-
tivity combining local, technical, instrumental, institutional, social, and epistemic 
aspects.”36 Many of the ﬁ eld’s terminological innovations gesture in the same di-
rection: the Foucauldian dispositif or apparatus, the “experimental assemblage,” the 
“network.” A handful of such systems have become paradigmatic. For instance, in 
seventeenth- century England, well- heeled gentlemen of the Royal Society gath-
ered to observe facts produced by carefully regulated instruments, including Robert 
Boyle’s air- pump, in experiments in Gresham College choreographed by Boyle. The 
scenography separated visible work performed by Boyle and other natural philoso-
phers from the labor of “invisible technicians,” the “lowly mechanics” who prepared 
the rooms, built and maintained much of the equipment, and assured the success-
ful conduct of experiments. The diagram of the elements linked by the air pump 
thus included humans—the fellows of the Royal Society; the mechanics; the ele-
ments brought into contact with it (barometers, mercury thermometers, candles, and 
doomed doves); the architectural setting; and the extension of this time and space 
into other times and spaces through the virtual witnessing made possible by the re-
porting in the Proceedings of the Royal Society.37 The instrument can be seen as the 
cornerstone of all these relationships. Similarly celebrated is the laboratory of Louis 
Pasteur, with its exemplary experiment involving two swan- necked ﬂ asks contain-
ing beef broth. After the swan neck was broken off of one of them and exposed to the 
air, tiny organisms grew in that solution, but not in the ﬂ ask whose neck remained 
unbroken. The demonstration and explication of these ﬂ asks helped make Pasteur’s 
lab “an obligatory point of passage” linking hygienists, the state, farmers, vintners, 
physicians, and thirsty schoolchildren.38 Likewise, the arrangement of Franciscus 
Cornelis Donders’s laboratory to correlate reaction times to cognitive events formed 
a map that articulated “partial objects derived from the experimenter and the ex-
perimental subject (eyes, hands, voices, etc.), more or less isolated organs (hearts, 
lungs, muscles, nerves, etc.), energy sources, styli, sooted paper, tables, notes, and 
publications.”39 As these familiar examples show, a map of mediations is not static 
but rather a chart of movement, a symphonic or choreographic transcription.
In music, two terms exist for this kind of complex organization: instrumentation 
and orchestration. The former describes the act of distributing musical material to 
instruments generally; the latter term is used in the speciﬁ c context of the particular 
assemblage we know as an orchestra. The instrumentation or orchestration of a par-
ticular piece of music depends upon numerous factors, ranging from the aesthetic to 
36 Rheinberger, Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube (Stan-
ford, Calif., 2007), 238. Rheinberger’s sense of the importance of procedural rules in an experimental 
system, as well as his division between “technical objects” (elements that remain ﬁ xed) and “epis-
temic things” (those that are subject to variation) suggests the close connection between a map of 
mediations and the speciﬁ c mode of mediation of its elements. 
37 Steve Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air- Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experi-
mental Life, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J., 2011).
38 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1988).
39 Henning Schmidgen, “The Donders Machine: Matter, Signs, and Time in a Physiological Experi-
ment, ca. 1865,” Conﬁ gurations 13, no. 2 (2005): 211– 56, on 211.
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the institutional. That is to say, the fact that we can speak of “orchestration” implies 
not just the existence of orchestras but also standardization in what those ensembles 
are. The term itself was ﬁ rst used in the nineteenth century and reﬂ ected the con-
solidation of the modern orchestra as a musical body, an institution, and a concept 
(roughly contemporary with an emerging standardization of scientiﬁ c laboratories 
and globally distributed observatories).40 This transformation radically altered how 
composers could interact with instruments and the ways in which they wrote for 
them. In the late seventeenth century, wind instruments frequently doubled already 
existing string parts; in the early eighteenth century it was not uncommon for com-
posers to write a generic upper line that either a ﬂ ute or oboe could play. Over the 
course of the eighteenth century, the ensemble expanded to include more instruments 
and became relatively uniform across geographical regions. This stability meant that 
composers writing for the orchestra could write instrument- speciﬁ c parts: parts for 
ﬂ utes, clarinets, and oboes would take advantage of the unique qualities of those 
particular instruments. By the early nineteenth century, it was expected that a piece 
of music for an orchestra would engage with the different voices of the ensemble 
in sensitive and effective ways. This involved knowing the technical capacities and 
limitations of each instrument and the effects that they could create when combined 
with each other. With this new way of engaging with the orchestra came a new kind 
of compositional aid: the instrumentation treatise. These documents were distinctly 
different from the organological treatises of the previous centuries, since they ad-
dressed both the collective practice of writing for instrumental combinations as well 
as the speciﬁ c qualities of individual instruments. Earlier treatises on instruments, by 
contrast, had sought to classify and categorize instruments, often emphasizing their 
similarities rather than their differences.
Though instrumentation treatises existed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, these have been largely overshadowed by Hector Berlioz’s Grand traité 
d’instrumentation et d’orchestration moderne.41 Berlioz, in lively language, instructs 
his reader about the personality and characters of each instrument and offers ex-
amples of their most effective uses, drawn from contemporaries such as Giacomo 
Meyerbeer as well as his precursors (Gluck, Beethoven, etc.). But crucially, Berlioz 
also discusses the art of combining instrumental sonorities, imagining what an ideal 
orchestra would look like (the answer involves over eight hundred instrumentalists 
and singers) and what sort of powerful and otherworldly sonic combinations could 
be achieved by such an ensemble. Just as important as understanding the individ-
ual instrumental characteristics and their combinations was knowing how to control 
them. A large ensemble risked devolving into mere noise, without the intervention of 
an all- powerful composer- conductor who could coordinate the myriad parts of the 
ensemble (Berlioz famously likened the orchestra to an enormous keyboard instru-
ment upon which the conductor played, and fantasized about synchronizing players 
via electrical telegraph). But Berlioz’s conception of orchestral music went beyond 
instruments and the conductor: equally crucial were the space in which the orchestra 
40 On the history of the orchestra as an institution, see John Spitzer and Neal Zaslaw, The Birth of the 
Orchestra (Oxford, 2004). On the history of the idea of orchestration, see Emily I. Dolan, “Haydn’s 
Creation and the Work of the Orchestra,” 19th- Century Music 34, no. 1 (2010): 3– 38.
41 Originally published in Paris, 1844; revised 1855; translated by Hugh Macdonald as Berlioz’s 
Orchestration Treatise: A Translation and Commentary (Cambridge, 2002).
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played (outdoor orchestral music, he argued, didn’t really exist) and the arrangement 
of the players in relation to the audience.
Berlioz’s treatise therefore alerts us to questions we might ask about instrumental 
collectives in both music and science: How do different instruments within a group 
relate to each other? How are they coordinated? What sort of spaces do they require? 
What institutions support the ensemble? Since the advent of electronic music in the 
1920s, many issues surrounding instrumentation and orchestration have transmuted 
into questions concerning the arrangement of studios and experimental music labs; 
now, on top of asking about the relationship between individual instruments, we can 
ask additional questions: How is a particular studio constituted? What is the relation-
ship between people developing new technologies and those producing music with 
those technologies? How do scientiﬁ c and musical practices merge and distinguish 
themselves? In their article in this volume, Cyrus Mody and Andrew Nelson explore 
precisely these sorts of questions; indeed, their study of the institutional and political 
contexts of the Center for Computer Research in Music and Acoustics at Stanford 
traces a map of mediations very much in the sense we are proposing.
THE ENDS OF INSTRUMENTS
To what ends are instruments used? This question has already lurked behind many 
of the above discussions. The answer may seem obvious in the case of musical in-
struments: a musical instrument is intended to play music. But even beyond the vast 
range of uses and meanings of musical performance, it’s also true that musical in-
struments have at various points been employed to nonmusical ends. Stepping be-
yond our limited Western focus for a moment, consider the shakuhachi ﬂ ute, made 
from bamboo root. An instrument capable of extreme nuance and subtle shading, the 
shakuhachi ﬂ ute is associated with a wide musical repertoire. In the Edo period, the 
instrument was used by the komuso monks, in the Fuke sect of Zen Buddhism, who 
played it as a means of breathing meditation. But these ﬂ utes served another purpose 
as well: shakuhachi ﬂ utes were also taken up by ronin, samurai warriors who lacked 
masters and were therefore forbidden to wear swords. Many became—or disguised 
themselves as—monks and carried and played ﬂ utes: the hefty, club- like ﬂ ute in their 
hands became a useful and discreet weapon.
Even if we restrict our investigation of musical instruments to more traditional musi-
cal performances, we can still ﬁ nd a variety of intended ends. One use of trombones in 
baroque- era sacred music was as an instrument of coordination. The trombone could 
double vocal parts and thereby help the singers keep their pitch. In the late Enlighten-
ment, we ﬁ nd a new use: in Mozart’s Don Giovanni, the trombone enters as the sound 
of sacred authority, signaling the ghostly presence of Il Commendatore, whom the las-
civious Don kills at the beginning of the opera. The trombone’s meaning in Mozart’s 
opera relied on its earlier function within the church; it was strongly associated with 
a sacred context, even if within that context it was not used to signal divine might.
Comparably, one historian of scientiﬁ c instruments has jokingly diagnosed what 
he calls “the astrolabe syndrome”: the difﬁ culty of ﬁ nding interesting things to say 
about the instruments most commonly displayed in science museums.42 But as far 
42 Jean François Gauvin, “The Astrolabe Syndrome,” JFG: Carrière et vie professionelle (blog), 9 
Mar. 2009, http:// jfgauvin2008.wordpress .com/ 2009/ 03/ 09/ the- astrolabe- syndrome/ .
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as an instrument’s telos goes—the overall projects within which it is inscribed, the 
ways in which it articulates humans’ relations to each other and to the cosmos—as-
trolabes could hardly be more compelling. The fact that there are so many of them, 
making up a signiﬁ cant proportion of many collections, underlines the wide avail-
ability of this instrument. In the early modern period, astrolabes were of use to travel-
ers, often on board ships driven by the tangle of motivations science historians have 
come to know well: the acquisition of commodities and specie, knowledge of the 
vast variety in the ﬂ ora and fauna of diverse regions of the world, enhancement of 
the standing of the sovereign sponsor, the gloriﬁ cation of God and the spreading of 
his word, the extension of empire through trade, conquest, and settlement. Further, 
a great number of the historical astrolabes in science museums are of Islamic origin. 
Asking about their telos leads to consideration of Islamic theories of the four winds; 
the importance of natural philosophy as a means of worship; and the place of astrol-
ogy in medieval Islamic courts. More vividly, the number and distribution of small, 
portable astrolabes, and the prominent markings on them that indicated the Qibla—
the direction of Mecca—show them as tools of social coordination across vast dis-
tances. Five times a day, in a wave across the planet that follows the movement of 
the sun across the sky, the faithful conduct their prayers, aligned to a single point in 
space, thanks to this handy tool.43
Similarly, tracing the different projects within which an instrument is deployed 
over time may illuminate large- scale structural transformations in the aims of musi-
cal composition and performance. The organ, for instance, has a long- standing as-
sociation with churches, cathedrals, and the liturgy; in the seventeenth century, the 
Jesuit natural philosopher Marin Mersenne investigated its mechanical properties as 
part of a project uniting worship with empirical and rational study: “Organs were 
the reiﬁ cation of Mersenne’s universal harmony, a harmony juxtaposing the spiritual 
and the worldly, the music of pure consonances with the levers, gears and bellows of 
a mechanical device. To worship God while listening to the music of an organ or to 
discover God’s natural creations by means of the latter’s mechanical parts was not 
that incongruous to someone like Mersenne.”44 In the nineteenth century, Meyer-
beer heightened the impact of his opera Robert le diable by employing an organ in 
the opera hall, a potentially risqué displacement from worship to entertainment.45 A 
similar journey was traced in the twentieth century, when the Hammond organ, de-
veloped as a less expensive and smaller replacement for church organs, drifted from 
gospel to blues and jazz, due in large part to “The Incredible” Jimmy Smith’s use of 
it on Blue Note albums including The Sermon! of 1958. The Hammond’s overdriven 
sound powered Bob Dylan’s momentous switch from folk to electric rock in 1965’s 
“Like a Rolling Stone”; it became an evocative, vibratory mainstay of psychedelic 
43 Sarah Schechner Genuth, “Astrolabes: A Cross- cultural and Social Perspective,” introduction to 
Western Astrolabes, by Roderick Webster and Marjorie Webster (Chicago, 1998); David King, As-
tronomy in the Service of Islam (Hampshire, 1993); “An Islamic Astrolabe,” on the Starry Messenger 
website of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University, http:// www 
.hps .cam.ac .uk/ starry/ isaslabe .html (accessed 4 Apr. 2013).
44 Jean- François Gauvin, “Music, Machines, and Theology (II),” JFG: Carrière et vie professio-
nelle (blog), 15 Mar. 2009, http:// jfgauvin2008.wordpress .com/ 2009/ 03/ 15/ music- machines- and
- theology- ii/ .
45 Emily I. Dolan and John Tresch, “ ‘A Sublime Invasion’: Meyerbeer, Balzac, and the Opera Ma-
chine,” Opera Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2011): 4– 31.
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rock of the 1960s and ’70s, and returned in the 1980s and ’90s as a favored texture in 
acid jazz and hip- hop, an aural nod to soulful precursors.
Scientiﬁ c instruments also serve many ends. They may be used in exploratory ba-
sic research or routine industrial production; like the thermometer, insulin meter, or 
calculator, they may be part of everyday domestic life. These differing modes of use 
make them part of different maps of mediation and connect them to different ends. 
In the eighteenth century, the instruments associated with Newtonian mechanics, in-
cluding telescopes, Atwood machines, and electrical machines, were used to inves-
tigate properties of nature; they could also publicly demonstrate the truths of natural 
philosophy. These distinct modes and maps, however, shared a common telos: con-
ﬁ rming Newtonian laws of nature as the basis of God’s stable universe, and establish-
ing natural philosophers as privileged interpreters of both divine and temporal laws.46 
In the nineteenth century, one could consider the role played by telescopes—John 
Herschel’s in South Africa or Lord Rosse’s in Parsonstown—in debates about natural 
theology, evolution, and multiple worlds, including the famous “moon hoax.” Later 
in the century, French popular astronomer Camille Flammarion’s telescope was a 
gateway to wonder for a mass audience. By the twentieth century the complex in-
struments of the observatory were put to work, worldwide, for national security, the 
space race, and the search for extraterrestrial life.47 Whether we discuss church or-
gans or telescopes, tracing instruments’ changing aims, and the ways they articulated 
humans’ relations to nature and to technology, may offer a revealing, perhaps coun-
terintuitive shorthand for the technical and cultural histories of music and science 
over several centuries.
CONCLUDING INTERACTIONS
Exploring the history of music and science along the four dimensions we have 
sketched—material disposition, mode of mediation, map of mediations, and telos—
aims to make visible the changes as well as the continuities in the ways in which 
instruments have been used and understood. In our scattershot examples, we have 
encountered several moments where the history of science and the history of music 
intersected. The ultimate aim of this study, of course, would be to make visible the 
historical patterns of these intersections. While we are still far short of an organologi-
cal précis (or epic) of this sort, a handful of inﬂ ection points seem particularly prom-
ising for further study.
For starters, we might consider the long- standing close relation between music, 
astronomy, arithmetic, and geometry inscribed in the medieval quadrivium, united 
by Pythagorean conceptions of form and relation. At the same time, we could ex-
plore the variable relationship between the sciences of the quadrivium as abstract 
theories and the practices that accompanied them: these liberal arts concerned with 
form were traditionally set above and apart from the lowlier mechanical arts that con-
cerned instruments and machines. At what points did the status of mathematical in-
struments and musical instruments change, and how did these changes correlate with 
46 Simon Schaffer, “Machine Philosophy: Demonstration Devices in Georgian Mechanics,” in Van 
Helden and Hankins, Instruments (cit. n. 1), 157– 82, on 160.
47 See Morrison- Low et al., From Earth- Bound to Satellite (cit. n. 19).
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changes in the theoretical sciences? For instance, a deﬁ ning feature of early modern 
science was the shift of natural philosophy from a primarily contemplative domain 
to a ﬁ eld dependent on instruments and experimentation.48 Might there be interesting 
comparisons between, on one hand, the relation of music as liberal art to music as 
performance, and, on the other, the relation of the sciences of arithmetic, geometry, 
and astronomy formerly associated with the quadrivium to the technical practices of 
mixed mathematics and experimental natural philosophy? How did the rising status 
of the mechanical arts in natural philosophy—as in Galileo’s prominent use of the 
telescope—affect conceptualizations of musical instruments in early modern music 
theory?
Moving forward in time, we have elsewhere examined continuities and breaks be-
tween Enlightenment and romantic- era uses and representations of both scientiﬁ c 
and musical instruments.49 Along with several contributors to this volume, we might 
consider the intersection of the musical and scientiﬁ c instruments in Helmholtz’s 
laboratory, his studies of the ear and the eye, and his artiﬁ cial production of stimuli 
to affect them. Focusing on the same period, however, we would further have to con-
sider the ways in which understandings of music and science bifurcated. Baudelaire’s 
famous attack in 1859 on photography as anathema to true art—which he believed 
to be concerned only with the imagination—was arguably embodied in Wagner’s 
choice at Bayreuth to make the orchestra invisible in front of the stage: audiences 
might be distracted from the spiritual and idealist transports of his music and spec-
tacle if they were forced to witness the instruments that made them possible. Later, 
the futurists’ love of technology led them to break from musical idealism as radi-
cally as possible, with Luigi Russolo’s Art of Noise manifesto: “We certainly pos-
sess nowadays over a thousand different machines, among whose thousand different 
noises we can distinguish. With the endless multiplication of machinery, one day 
we will be able to distinguish among ten, twenty or thirty thousand different noises. 
We will not have to imitate these noises but rather to combine them according to our 
artistic fantasy.”50 This ambition—and this new alliance between music and other 
technologies—continued into musique concrète. As we suggested at the beginning 
of this article, the tendency seems to have reached a new plateau in contemporary 
music: the MIDI sampler and subsequent music- composition programs that repro-
duce the waveforms of all existing musical instruments transform incidental sounds 
captured from any setting and produced by any means into musical instruments. The 
electronic archive of musical sounds becomes the potentially inﬁ nite supply source 
for cut- and- paste compositional practices, at the same time as scientiﬁ c discovery 
is reconceived, across disciplines, as the automatic, algorithmic mining of vast, de-
localized databases.
Such would be some of the turning points signaled in a longer story that could be 
48 Peter Dear, “What Is History of Science the History Of? Early Modern Roots of the Ideology of 
Modern Science,” Isis 96 (2005): 390– 406; see also Lissa L. Roberts, Simon Schaffer, and Peter Dear, 
eds., The Mindful Hand: Inquiry and Invention from the Late Renaissance to Early Industrialisation 
(Amsterdam, 2007).
49 Emily I. Dolan, The Orchestra Revolution: Haydn and the Technologies of Timbre (Cambridge, 
2013); John Tresch, The Romantic Machine: Utopian Science and Technology after Napoleon (Chi-
cago, 2012). 
50 Russolo, The Art of Noise: Futurist Manifesto, 1913, trans. Robert Filliou (New York, 2004), 12. 
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woven out of the materials furnished by a more complete organology of music and 
science. We conclude with a more modest tale, one from a period when the tech-
niques of beautiful sound and natural knowledge were also closely entwined and 
promised new experiences and a new framing of the world. Back in the 1770s, one of 
the founders of musicology, Charles Burney, made a number of trips around Europe 
to collect material for his famed four- volume History of Music. He visited church 
organs, encountered street music, went to the opera, and heard a variety of orchestras 
perform. At the same time, he carried out acoustical experiments, testing the proper-
ties of the echo in the Villa Simonetta on the outskirts of Milan; he sought out and 
admired a grand orrery built by Matthew Hahn; and he visited the Jesuit scholar and 
astronomer Roger Boscovich and the physicist Laura Bassi, both of whom demon-
strated for him their instruments and machines, much to Burney’s delight.
For Burney, to understand music and physics, opera and astronomy, one had to 
have ﬁ rsthand experience with the instruments involved in their execution and per-
formance. Burney further declared that with more time he would have gone beyond 
musicology to create a journal dedicated to “the present state of arts and sciences, 
in general.”51 A new organology could underwrite such a project, allowing it to em-
brace a wider history, curating, concretizing, and animating it with the multifarious 
objects that reside (though often far apart) in museum collections. Now, at a moment 
when all sounds and phenomena are portrayed as collapsing into a single medium of 
easily convertible data, music scholars and historians of science can gain by retriev-
ing some of Burney’s avid, eye- and ear- witness attention to the concrete spaces, rou-
tines of practice, community formations, and creative lines of ﬂ ight in both musical 
and scientiﬁ c forms of life. In exploring what we have been calling the ethical speci-
ﬁ cities of the instruments that hold such arrangements together, they can begin once 
more to measure out the discords and harmonies between these ﬁ elds.
51 Charles Burney, The Present State of Music in Germany, the Netherlands, and United Provinces, 
2 vols. (London, 1775), 2:332.
